DU Undergraduate Research Journal Archive
Volume 3

Issue 1

Article 3

1-10-2022

The Populist Paradox: A Critical Framework Proposal
Megan Morrell
University of Denver

Seth Masket
University of Denver - Advisor

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/duurj
Part of the American Politics Commons, and the Political Theory Commons

Recommended Citation
Morrell, Megan and Masket, Seth (2022) "The Populist Paradox: A Critical Framework Proposal," DU
Undergraduate Research Journal Archive: Vol. 3: Iss. 1, Article 3.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/duurj/vol3/iss1/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for
inclusion in DU Undergraduate Research Journal Archive by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For
more information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu.

The Populist Paradox: A Critical Framework Proposal
Abstract
Donald Trump’s presidency has undeniably reignited academic interest in understanding the populist
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Abstract
Donald Trump’s presidency has undeniably reignited academic interest in understanding the populist
phenomenon and its political implications. Trumpian politics are frequently considered to be a stark
departure from status quo politics, in favor of a radical right populism. Yet, the Trump presidency and
populist theory itself poses a key contradiction, namely a populist paradox. I will propose a critical
framework to understand populism as a mechanism of political power by the liberal state. In What is
Populism?, Jan-Werner Müller identifies a contradictory nature to populism, as it often perpetuates the
same political problems that the populist politics sought to replace. How could populist ideology, which
is lauded as recognizing the systematic failures of the liberal state, also be a mechanism for its continued
control? This paradox requires a theoretical framework to explain and unpack its implications. The
seminal work of political philosopher Michel Foucault has immense explanatory power for this paradox
when utilized as a conceptual framework. Populism ideology functions as a democratic justification for
the maintenance of status-quo politics, which ultimately reproduces state power. I intend to develop
a theoretical contribution to radical right populism studies, especially in regard to Trumpism in the
United States. Interpreting Foucault’s state power theories, this article applies the key concepts of powerknowledge, domination, and governmentality to populism studies.

1 LITERATURE REVIEW
It is important to appreciate, foremost, what is meant by
populism and the context in which populist politics occur. In short, it is a moralistic ideology in which a leader
and/or party claims true representation of a political
body also referred to as ‘the people.’ Liberal democracies tend to host the political conditions for populism,
and these types of states are positioned as antithetical to
the populist cause. The construction of ‘the people’ will
first be analyzed, followed by a broader political contextualization of the populist phenomenon. This analysis
will also focus on what Mudde has coined “the populist
radical right” 1 . This includes populist leaders, parties,
movements, etc. that accompany a significantly conservative host ideology. Cases such as former President
Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, Podemos in Spain, former
President Rafael Correa in Ecuador, etc. are far too diverse to conceptualize neatly alongside right flavors
of populism. There is value in narrowing the scope of
inquiry when discussing such a broad and complex ideology. When the term ‘populism’ is used in this analysis,
it implies the radical right notion of the word. Further,
it is crucial to delineate the difference between populism ideology, and evaluations of populist governance
in actuality. The criteria and circumstances surrounding populism as an ideology, or in its ideal state, will

be articulated in the literature review. The analytical
section transitions into assessing populist governance,
which often proves inconsistent with the ideology. Finally, there exists a vast variety of populism scholarship
with, often, oppositional definitions and conceptualizations of the phenomenon. In this analysis, I mainly rely
on the theoretical works of Cas Mudde and Jan-Werner
Müller. These scholars are some of the foremost and
most widely cited in the field. Further research should
be dedicated to alternative understandings of populism
that cannot be fully captured in the space of this article.
1.1 Constructing ‘The People’
Firstly, populism scholar Cas Mudde identifies a few
key criteria for populist ideology. He defines populism as “an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt
elite,’ and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the
people” 2 . Essentially, populism at its core must engage
in a fragmentation of a body politic into two fundamentally oppositional groups which compete for political
representation. The populist makes a claim to represent
a majority of common people in the nation and seeks to
execute politics in their favor. This group represented
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by the populist is considered to be ‘the people’ of a
nation.
Importantly, Mudde also categorizes populism as a
uniquely ‘thin-centered ideology’ 2 to address the oftencontradictory nature of defining populism. How can
leaders such as Hugo Chávez and Viktor Orbán both
exist under the umbrella of populism with their vast
political differences? A thin populism must accompany
what Mudde calls a stronger ‘host ideology’ or ‘thick
ideology’ that provides meaningful political substance
to the populist leader, party, etc. For instance, the Prime
Minister of Hungary, Viktor Orbán, is often classified
by scholars as a populist leader. His substantive political ideology, however, is more accurately classified as
radical right or conservative. Austerity policies to cut
taxes for many Hungarian companies 3 is a conservative strategy, as it mirrors other conservative policies,
but not necessarily the politics of other populist leaders.
Former president of Venezuela, Hugo Chávez, on the
other hand, almost doubled the tax rate for foreign oil
companies in 2006 4 . Both leaders tend to be classified
as populist by academics yet have immensely different
and even oppositional policy agendas. Rather than “a
‘full’ or ‘thick’ ideology (such as liberalism or socialism) ... thin ideologies have a much more restricted
core and focus on only a limited number of key concepts ... [and] do not attempt to provide the ideational
roadmap for the wide range of questions that a full
ideology would” 5 . Populism does not necessarily assume any political stance or policy advocacy, but rather
looks to the ‘host ideology’ for political substance. For
Orbán and Chávez, their populist ideology does not
inform their policy agendas regarding taxation nearly
as much as their thicker and substantive host ideologies
of radical right conservatism and socialism respectively.
Populism, itself, is not a reliable resource for a policy
agenda, so leaders utilize accompanying thicker ideologies to form their substantive politics. From this, it
is useful to characterize populism as a thin ideology
to be understood as accompanying a more substantial
ideology.
Further, populism is best thought of as a thin ideology as opposed to merely a rhetorical tool that can
describe any or every politician or party. Populism is a
combination of the following criteria, rather than instantiating certain parts. A politician can critique a political
elite without utilizing moralism or holism and would,
thus, not be considered properly populist. Similarly, a
moralistic political stance need not be populist if it does
not support the general will of the people. At its core,
ideology itself is “a system of ideas that aspires both to
explain the world and to change it. The populist, for instance, explains the world (or the nation) as consisting
of two inherently oppositional groups within a liberal
democratic system that has left ‘the people’ disenfranchised. In order to resolve the issues of an increasingly

distant technocratic government, the populist proposes
that they govern for ‘the people.’ Thus, populism’s ideological contribution cannot be attributed to any or all
politicians but is rather a unique political phenomenon.
Secondly, the construction of ‘the people’ is also
uniquely moralistic and couched in values. Mudde
writes that populism is “moralistic rather than programmatic” 2 , or focuses on inclusion and exclusion
rather than political substance. Scholars such as Müller
agree, and write that “the claim to exclusive representation is not an empirical one; it is always distinctly
moral ... [and] the populist logic also implies that whoever does not support populist parties might not be a
proper part of the people- always defined as righteous
and morally pure” 6 . The question of belonging to ‘the
people’ of a nation also becomes a fundamental and
morally existential one. It is notable that this logic relies
upon moral symbols rather than evidential logic. Essentially, “what matters for populists is less the product
of a genuine process of will-formation or a common
good that anyone with common sense can glean than a
symbolic representation of the ‘real people’ from which
the correct policy is then deduced ... [which] renders
the political positions of a populist immune to empirical refutation” 6 . Specifically, “populism requires a pars
pro toto argument and a claim to exclusive representation, understood in a moral, as opposed to empirical sense” 6 . For instance, Trump’s “condemnation of
‘Crooked Hillary’ during his 2016 election campaign, to
which the crowd responded by chanting ‘lock her up!’. . .
[and] listing of unacceptable/corrupt acts committed
by Congresswoman Ilhan Omar against ‘hard-working
Americans,’ to which the crowd responded by chanting ‘send her back!”’ 7 demonstrate clear judgement
of the morality of his political oppositions. Ultimately,
the populist “may not win 100 percent of the vote, but
they lay claim to 100 percent of the support of good,
hardworking folks who have been exploited by the establishment” 8 .
This characterization of populism as a specifically
moralistic ideology does not reduce populist ideology
as based solely on whims and illogical emotions of a
group. To do so would simplify the complexity of populist ideology. Rather, while populist ideology is rooted
in moralism and emotion, that is not to say that it is
inherently illegitimate or unconvincing. That is proven
untrue by cases of populist political success such as
former President Donald Trump in the US, President
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Turkey, President Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil, etc. There would be no reason to study
populist politics if it could be so reduced. Ultimately,
“it is not just patronizing to explain the entire [populist]
phenomenon as an inarticulate political expression. . . it
is also not really an explanation” 6 .
Moreover, belonging to ‘the people’ of a nation is
more consequential than merely an individual’s claim-
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ing of a political identity. To populists, “opponents are
not just people with different priorities and values, they
are evil!” 2 A necessary component of constructing ‘the
people’ of a nation as morally righteous and pure, is
the creation of a foil, or opposite, which instantiates opposite characteristics within ‘the other.’ Consequently,
political “compromise [becomes] impossible, as it ‘corrupts’ the purity” 2 and ‘the people’ and ‘the other’
become fundamentally incompatible and existentially
threatening to each other. Populists position “the pure,
innocent, always hardworking people against a corrupt elite who do not really work (other than to further
their self-interest) and, in right-wing populism, also
against the very bottom of society (those who also do
not really work and live like parasites off the work of
others)” 6 . ‘The people’ are also often characterized as
“the ‘common people’ (the part of the res publica made
up of commoners, or in modern terms: the excluded,
the downtrodden, and the forgotten)” 6 . Ultimately, the
“core claim of populism ... [is that] only some of the
people are really the people” 6 .
Thus, in constructing ‘the people’ of a nation, the
group becomes a political “macrosubject” 6 , and is understood by the populist leader as a homogenous and
morally pure entity which they have the sole representative claim. A political holism develops, which is “the
notion that the polity should no longer be split and the
idea that it’s possible for the people to be one and- all
of them- to have one true representative” 6 . Within this
claim to representation, there is also a subsequent mediatory role that the populist subsumes. Populists always
want “to cut out the middleman, so to speak, and to
rely as little as possible on complex party organizations
as intermediaries between citizens and politicians” 6 .
The populist leader becomes a site in which politics is
accessed by ‘the people,’ and in turn, a conductor for
politics to access the true will of ‘the people.’
Lastly, here are a few common critiques of populism
that ought to be mentioned. Namely, populist ideological opposition to pluralism and debate, and its support for holism. Pluralism is one of the first clear issues
within populist ideology, demonstrated when the populist can no longer conceive a legitimate opposition to
the morally righteous politics of the populists. A pluralistic perspective, in contrast, would value the coexistence and collaboration of multiple political values together in a representative state. This inherently has negative consequences for political debate and democratic
norms that require one to legitimize, while not necessarily agreeing with, one’s opposition. Müller writes
that “when [populists] are in power, there is likewise
no such thing as a legitimate opposition” 6 .
Similarly, the multi-dimensionality and variety that
exists within a body politic cannot be fully captured by
populist holism. The formation process for constructing the people requires it to “be ‘extracted’ from the

sum total of actual citizens ... [and] then presumed to
be morally pure and unerring in its will” 6 . However,
fundamentally, a “whole people can never be grasped
and represented- not least because it never remains the
same, not even for a minute: citizens die, new citizens
are born ... [and] yet it is always tempting to claim that
one can actually know the people as such” 6 . To conceive
of ‘the people’ as a monolith is a contested assumption
by many scholars.
1.2 Contextualizing ‘The People’: Liberal
Democracy and Technocracy
The context in which populist politics emerges is also a
contentious subject for populism scholars. In what kind
of political environment do populist politics emerge?
One of the prerequisite claims made by populists is that
their democratic state has failed to meaningfully represent common citizens, also known as ‘the people.’ Many
political contexts for populism exist within a ‘liberal
democratic state.’ Definitionally, a “liberal democracy is
a system in which [citizens] participate by voting for a
representative who usually comes from a political party,
and where the scope of government is limited by liberal
freedoms and the rule of law” 9 . In essence, a liberal
democracy is characterized by a fair and free representative voting system alongside individual liberties. The
core concept of this kind of system is that voters can
have meaningful influence in their nation’s politics and
feel politically efficacious. Liberal democracy is also
fundamentally “based on pluralism—on the idea that
you have different groups with different interests and
values, which are all legitimate” 8 . Currently, “96 out of
167 countries with populations of at least 500,000 (57%)
were democracies of some kind, and only 21 (13%) were
autocracies.” Populism, as defined, tends to only be
meaningfully present in democratic states.
The ideal of the liberal democratic state, however,
is not realized from the populist’s perspective. Rather,
populist politics claim to be “a potential corrective for a
politics that has somehow become too distant from ‘the
people”’ 10 . Some populism scholars come to agree with
the populist’s recognition of the shortcomings of the
state but may not support particular attempts to alleviate the issues. For example, Richard Hofstadter wrote
in his seminal text The Age of Reform that historically,
“populism was the first modern political movement
of practical importance in the United States to insist
that the federal government has some responsibility for
the common weal.” Further, scholars such as Chantal
Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau characterize the shortcomings of the liberal democratic state but depart towards
a progressive and leftist populism. Left populism is
an attempt to “radicalize social democracy” and oppose a “bourgeois democracy” in a way that addresses
some of the very same issues that mobilize radical right
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populists. Essentially, most instances of populism identify an issue with the existing government but deviate
when it comes to policy agendas aimed at fixing the
problems. These differences can be attributed to the differences in ‘thick’ ideologies that accompany populism.
Nevertheless, this particular investigation attempts to
isolate the radical right flavor of populism for clarity
and analytical purposes.
Populist ideology juxtaposes itself with the existing
liberal democratic establishment, which is often characterized as technocratic and far removed from the real
lives of citizens. There is a “long tradition of a more
‘elitist’ conception of democracy [controlled by] ... increasingly distant and technocratic political and economic elites.” Namely, populists often argue that “liberal democracies are increasingly dominated by highly
educated and liberal elites whose backgrounds and outlook differ fundamentally from those of the average
citizen; a development that has been exacerbated by
the rise of a new ‘governance elite’, connected through
informal and formal networks that cut across elected
national governments.” Thomas Frank described this
view of liberal democracies as the “elitist theory of
democracy” in which there is reason for political disenfranchisement. It is a conception of the state as a
system that works to maintain “consensus quietly, harmoniously, and without too much interference from
subaltern groups.” Populists construct their political
style as a foil to the established elite similarly to the
process of characterizing ‘the people.’ Benjamin Moffitt
recognizes that populists prefer ‘common sense’ or the
wisdom of the people, ‘bad manners,’ and emotionality,
whereas the technocratic style centers expertise and specialized training, ‘proper manners,’ dry and scientific
language, and emotional neutrality, or ‘rationality.’ In
other words, “technocracy and populism are mirror images: one is managerial, the other charismatic: one seeks
incremental change, the other is attracted by grandiose
rhetoric; one is about problem solving, the other about
the politics of identity.”
Liberal democratic nations can thus witness “a crisis
of faith in democracy, with political party membership
falling dramatically and citizens finding themselves
more and more disillusioned with mainstream politics.”
The successes of populism can be “connected to what
one might call promises of democracy that have not
been fulfilled.” Essentially, many political theorists conceptualize populism as a response to waning political
efficacy and a desire from regular citizens to be recognized by political leaders. For instance, in the United
States, “high levels of inequality, coupled with high levels of distrust, apparently strengthened resentment towards economic and political elites, providing the right
environment for Trump’s “drain the swamp” rhetoric.”
Interestingly, there is empirical truth to some of the issues identified by populists (on the left and right), cou-

pled with misinformation. There is truth to concerns
about economic inequality in the US, for instance, as “a
greater share of the nation’s aggregate income is now
going to upper-income households and the share going
to middle- and lower-income households is falling ...
[and] the share of American adults who live in middleincome households has decreased from 61% in 1971 to
51% in 2019.” However, populist politics is also prone to
misinformation and baseless conspiracy theories, which
will be investigated more thoroughly in the Trumpian
Populism section. Thus, populist politics recognizes citizens’ real disillusionment with their national politics
and the liberal democratic state, while also engaging
with unsubstantiated issues.
Populist politics emerge through a disillusionment
with the established liberal democratic state and seek
to provide an alternative governance that meaningfully represents ‘the people’. Elitist and technocratic
impulses of the state are met with oppositional political strategies of the populist, who attempt to appeal
to common sense, emotionality, and moralism. There
is empirical validity to the shortcomings of the liberal
democratic establishment, yet misinformation continues to pervade populist rhetoric. There is more to be
said about knowledge dissemination and misinformation in the following sections.
1.3 Applications to Trumpian Populism
Donald Trump can be considered a populist leader
because his political style and governance meets a
few aforementioned criteria: recognition of and exclusive claim to represent ‘the people’ of a nation, antipluralism, and moralism. For instance, Trump tweeted
the phrase ‘the people’ roughly 609 times between January 27th, 2011 and January 3rd, 2021, often making
sweeping claims about a population. He clearly speaks
to, and about, a certain group of people in the US, which
he claims to represent politically. Trump has claimed
that “[he] alone can fix the broken system in Washington. . . promising to serve as the ‘voice’ of the ‘forgotten
men and women of our country.”’ At his inauguration,
Trump declared that “January 20th, 2017, will be remembered as the day the people became the rulers of
this nation again.”
Further, the January 6th, 2021 riots at the Capitol in
Washington DC demonstrate an exclusive claim to represent the people, which extends far enough to even
make claims to delegitimize the 2020 presidential election results. The Trump campaign and its supporters
went to court over the election results in 6 US states
as an attempt to reverse the election results. This example clearly shows a lack of dedication to plural and
tolerant politics, to the point of contesting what was
considered a free and fair election. This mirrors the concept that the populist “may not win 100 percent of the
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vote, but they lay claim to 100 percent of the support of
good, hardworking folks who have been exploited by
the establishment.”
Lastly, Trumpian rhetoric is famously values-based
and moralistic. This is exemplified in a tweet from the
former president: “The Governor of Michigan should
give a little and put out the fire. These are very good
people, but they are angry. They want their lives back
again, safely! See them, talk to them, make a deal.” The
narrative that his following consists of good people
that are disillusioned with establishment politics, is
quintessential populist rhetoric. A morally righteous
and disenfranchised people are being recognized and
advocated for by the former president. Thus, Trumpian
populism proves to be a useful case study for populism,
and in particular, radical right populism. The paradox
of populism, in which populist leaders “[reinforce], or
[offer] another variety of the very exclusion and the
usurpation of the state that it most opposes,” is also
quite relevant to Donald Trump’s presidency.
2 ANALYSIS
Populism fundamentally claims to be a liberatory and
democratic force in the face of political oppression.
However, do populists in power actually rule for ‘the
people,’ or do their policies end up mirroring the very
technocracy it positions as its opposition? Jan-Werner
Müller writes that “populism in power brings about,
reinforces, or offers another variety of the very exclusion and the usurpation of the state that it most opposes in the reigning establishment it seeks to replace.”
Specifically, “what the ‘old establishment’ or ‘corrupt,
immoral elites’ supposedly have always done, the populists will also end up doing- only, one would have
thought, without guilt and with a supposedly democratic justification.” In this way, populism can be “deployed to their own advantage by the very traditional
elites that ‘people power’ was supposed to sweep away
in democratic revolution.” Hofstadter recognizes a similar phenomenon in his historical work on US populism
in the progressive era. Namely, he writes that, “one of
the ironic problems confronting [populist and progressive] reformers around the turn of the century was that
the very activities they pursued in attempting to defend to restore the individualistic values they admired
brought them closer to the techniques of organizations
they feared.” Essentially, these scholars amongst others
articulate paradoxical inconsistencies between the ideals of populism as a liberatory and radically democratic
ideology and the actualized populist governance.
In order to make sense of this contradiction, it is important to consider what kinds of incentive structures
exist within a liberal democratic political establishment.
The populist faces different pressures and motivations
during a campaign, or in a state of mobilization, than

they face as a leader within a government structure. As
a result, it is vital to recontextualize the populist within
a system of governance to clarify the aforementioned
paradox. Specifically, how does an institution such as
the state deal with criticism? What is at stake when a
state is criticized? This is the point in which frameworks
for understanding social and political power become
important to extend understanding of populism. Departing quickly from this notion, as Müller does, is analytically insufficient. However, looking at the work of
Michel Foucault can resolve the logical tension existing
in Müller’s argument.
2.1 Constructing a Foucauldian Framework
There are three main ideas from the work of Michel Foucault that are essential in understanding state incentive
structures and the general ways in which state power
functions. Namely, the concepts of power-knowledge,
domination, and governmentality together build a Foucauldian framework which can be employed to make
sense of populism’s paradox.
Firstly, Foucault theorizes knowledge and power as
integrated with one another and mutually reinforcing
phenomena. There is no real separation between the
concepts and they ought to be considered together. He
coined the term ‘pouvoir-savoir,’ or ‘power-knowledge,’
where knowledge is created, influenced, spread, etc.
power resides. Essentially, the term attempts to call attention to “the involvement of knowledge in the maintenance of power relations.” Conceiving of power and
knowledge in this interconnected way is also a basic
foundational concept in the tradition of critical theory.
Notably, domination is a conceptual subset of power
relations. It is a situation in which asymmetrical power
relations become fixed, where power relations are generally considered by Foucault to be mobile, and fluid.
In other words, when power becomes concentrated and
maintained within certain people, institutions, organizations, etc. a dominating relationship can exist. There
are three major types of power according to Foucault:
Sovereign Power, Disciplinary Power, and Biopower.
This framework straddles all three types, as Foucault
conceives of their presence (at differing degrees) in all
institutions, apparatuses, and states.
Further, Foucault applies this conceptualization of
power to real institutions, such as states. He theorizes
the state to necessarily contain regulatory systems that
maintain and establish order, and arguably, dominance.
Specifically, the state “requires an apparatus that will
ensure that the population, which is seen as the sources
and the root, as it were, of the state’s power and wealth,
will work properly, in the right place, and on the right
objects.” In other words, political power relations require consistent upkeep and management. The state as
an institution requires intentional systems that work
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to reproduce and maintain existing power relations, in
which it benefits. Fundamentally, “the essential function of society or the State ... is to take control of life,
to manage it.” This is specifically a dominating power
relation because the state intends to make sure that
the population functions in a specific manner, which
is necessarily a rigid goal that is opposed to the free
movement of typical power.
Foucault begins to define the state through its managerial and dominating nature. He writes that the state
consists of “a regime of multiple governmentalities.”
The concept of governmentality is a portmanteau that
combines the terms government and rationality in order
to express instances of “activity meant to shape, guide,
or affect the conduct of people.” Essentially, governmentality and the act of governance works to influence
the actions of a group of people. Order is the result
and ultimate goal of governmentality and state management. Foucault writes that “order is what remains
when everything that is prohibited has in fact been
prevented.” Thus, movement and “circulation [are] ...
the essential problem of security.” An order is reached
once movement of power and knowledge is controlled
and fixed. Ultimately, the identification of power as
connected to knowledge, domination as a rigid concentration of power, and governmentality as a mechanism
for state management proves useful in contextualizing
populist leaders in power, which will be investigated in
the following section.
2.2 Applying a Foucauldian Framework:
Trumpian Populism
The core theoretical claim of this section includes the
following: the populist project aims to position the
populist leader as the primary mediator of political
knowledge. From this position, the populist works
to control both the source and substance of political
knowledge that is communicated to citizens which, in
turn, allows for the concentration of power in the state.
Power, as Foucault conceives of it, parallels the control and movement of knowledge. When the state encounters criticism, such as populist challenges to the
liberal establishment, it works to neutralize this opposition through knowledge control apparatuses. The
ultimate consequence of this phenomenon is governmentality and management of a citizenry. This creates
a self-reproducing system in which the state maintains
its power over the nation.
Firstly, regarding the source of knowledge, populists
such as Trump simultaneously work to become the major site of political knowledge for their constituency and
to limit other competing sources of information. Like
the use of Twitter for political communication and communication of the ‘fake news’ narrative, in the case of
Trump.. Many followers of Trump look to his Twitter

account as an access point to learn what is happening in
their national politics. This account was not only used
as a personal platform, but frequently included information about current US politics. For instance, Trump
tweeted from this account referencing the Speaker of
the House, Nancy Pelosi, 362 times and used his Twitter
platform to engage with the Supreme Leader of North
Korea, Kim Jong-un, to say: “[w]ill someone from his
depleted and food starved regime please inform him
that I too have a Nuclear Button, but it is a much bigger
& more powerful one than his, and my Button works!”
These tweets were communicated to the account’s 80.3
million followers. Not only did Trump have a considerable number of followers, but this rise in attention to
his Twitter platform was accompanied by a rejection of
traditional mainstream media sources. Media sources,
which were historically sites of knowledge transfer for
US citizens about politics, have undergone a significant
delegitimization for Trump’s sympathizers. Trump’s
quintessential ‘fake news’ campaign has led many of
his followers to turn their attention towards him for
political knowledge instead of “mainstream news organizations [which] have experienced a considerable decline in public confidence.” This is a departure from the
typical style of establishment leaders. While most politicians, regardless of political ideology, attempt to create
convincing political narratives, few actively work to
discredit and antagonize mainstream media as Trump
has.
Fake news is defined as “fabricated information that
has the format of news content but not the editorial standards and practices of legitimate journalism.” Note that
there is some empirical truth being referenced by Trump
in the recognition of ‘fake news’ and misinformation
in a rapidly advancing digital age. Take for instance a
study by Statista media researcher, Amy Watson, which
found in March 2020 that “around 47 percent of surveyed U.S. adults had encountered a lot or at least some
news about the coronavirus which seemed completely
made up, highlighting the issue of fake news circulation
and unreputable sources seeking to capitalize on the
public’s need for news and updates in times of crisis.”
Misinformation is not unique to the Covid-19 crisis,
but is an intrinsic feature of our modern technological
society.
The vetting processes for creating legitimate and rigorous news reporting has been challenged by the rise
of social media platforms, in which anyone can create,
spread, etc. news information. Anyone with a Facebook account can make a post about current events
that is factually untrue, and it is available to be seen
by all of their friends. There is far more information
existing online than ever before, but again, without
the same fact-checking and validity standards as traditional media sources. However, the claim of ‘fake
news’ by Trump while referencing a real crisis in news
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media, does not do the important work of creating critical media consumers. Rather than encouraging critical
and intentional consumption of media, the ‘fake news’
campaign has only worked to contribute to the confusion, and lead followers of Trump to view less and
less sources as credible, while increasingly looking to
him for political knowledge. Instead of reading articles
from the New York Times, one might log onto Twitter to see what the president has Tweeted today. This
phenomenon works to establish Trump on Twitter as a
primary mediator and source of political knowledge.
It is also noteworthy that Twitter was the chosen platform for political communication by Trump’s team and
administration. Not only is it one of the most popular
social media platforms, but it also has strategic communication features. Namely, “because of its character
limitation, Twitter structurally disallows the communication of detailed and sophisticated messages. . . a
Tweet may be clever or witty, but it cannot be complex.”
The nuance of typical political reporting is not well
captured when shifting from article-based communication to the simplification of a Tweet. Many see this
as a way that Trump strips away the ‘political correctness’ or the niceties often seen in political communication and speaks in headlines. This is another way in
which Trump can claim to speak for the ‘the people,’
who are often alienated from the complex jargon and
euphemisms used by a typical politician in a liberal
democracy. Instead of consuming lengthy and nuanced
pieces full of politicalese, Trump’s following looks to
him for quick snippets and headlines to understand
current political news.
Further, populist ideology tends to reject the need
for political debate. If the populist is an instantiation
of ‘the people,’ who are the legitimate political stakeholders of a nation, then debate is a waste of time. The
populist need not quibble about policy when they are
legitimated as the true and sole representation of a nation’s citizenry. Knowledge mediation, in particular, is
a necessary precondition for the elimination of debate.
Ultimately, “‘real Americans’ can be done with the media and have direct access (or, rather, the illusion of
direct contact with) a man who is not just a celebrity;
the self-declared ‘Hemingway of 140 characters’ [who]
uniquely tells it like it is.” If power and knowledge
are intertwined like Foucault theorizes they are, then
Trump sequesters more and more power as he is able
to be the almost exclusive point of access to knowledge
for citizens about politics. Lastly, I do not intend to
conceptualize knowledge transfer as solely a top-down
phenomenon, which would be far too simplistic. Knowledge does not have merely a one-way movement from
those in political power down to their constituencies.
Rather, it might be most useful to understand Trump’s
strategy as an attempt to consolidate sites of knowledge
transfer from multiple parties and to multiple parties.

The populist also works to influence the substance or
content of political knowledge in the state. For instance,
conspiracy theories are “not a curious addition to the
populist rhetoric; they are rooted in and emerge from
the very logic of populism itself.” The anti-pluralism
and emotional appeal over policy and logical appeal
uniquely facilitate misinformation for populists. Essentially, “what distinguishes democratic politicians from
populists is that the former make representative claims
in the form of something like hypotheses that can be
empirically disproven on the basis of the actual results
of regular procedures and institutions like elections.”
For example, regarding the 2020 presidential election,
Trump “retweeted a baseless report that the votingmachine system had ‘deleted 2.7 million Trump votes
nationwide,”’ among other false statements regarding
the integrity of the election. Further, the ‘birtherism’
conspiracy also exemplifies how misinformation was
strategically weaponized in favor of Trump. He famously “embraced the birther theory wholesale, wielding his trademark innuendos.” The birthplace of former president, Barack Obama, has been substantiated
numerous times (Honolulu, HI). Yet, questions of this
conspiracy continued to surface amongst Trump supporters despite the factual evidence. Ironically, Trump
has tweeted the phrase ‘fake news’ 940 times.
Trump also utilizes the ‘drain the swamp’ rhetoric to
address the real disillusionment of average people with
the technocratic tendencies of the US liberal democracy. In many liberal democracies, including the US,
there is an “increasing perception of corruption in public services – and the impunity enjoyed by those who
profit from it – [which] is increasingly pushing countries
towards populist politicians who promise to change
the system and break the cycle of corruption and privilege.” Populists, including Trump, are not the only
politicians or parties with anti-corruption or anti-elite
platforms, but nevertheless capitalize on this stance.
Simultaneously, Trump “has openly accepted alleged
‘emoluments,’ foreign and domestic government payments and benefits forbidden by the U.S. Constitution”
and has faced investigation of “tax dodges, illegal campaign contributions, and improper foreign contributions to his inaugural committee.” The very issues recognized in ‘drain the swamp’ rhetoric are perpetuated
by the Trump administration. In fact, Trump’s cabinet
consisted of “17 millionaires, 2 centimillionaires and
1 billionaire,” and was “the most wealthy group of
people who have served in a presidential Cabinet in
history.” Nevertheless, Trump’s approval rating stayed
consistently between 30-40% throughout his presidency.
The inconsistencies between his populist ideology and
rhetoric in his campaign and the realities of his governance did not meaningfully impact his political influence. Rather, it is arguable that the continuation of ‘the
swamp’ has seen a “democratic justification,” just as
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Müller theorizes.
From this, populism, in its radical right flavor, is a
democratic justification and governing strategy that allows establishment politics to continue but with dissent
essentially neutralized. Trump can simultaneously critique ‘the swamp’ and technocratic liberal state, while
mirroring that same governance with an ultra-rich cabinet. The issues of the liberal democratic state can persist,
but under the guise of the popular rule of ‘the people.’
Again, the state employs mechanisms of management
in order to govern the state towards a democratically
justified order, which describes the role that populism
plays as a democratic justification. Populists such as
Donald Trump, strategically position themselves to be
exclusive sources of political information, which they
can then manipulate in their favor. This is distinct from
typical political rhetoric, which attempts to be convincing yet does not claim exclusivity and typically depends
on empirical knowledge and logic. Sources and mediators of knowledge also wield significant power. This
power is not the free-flowing and symmetrical relation, but rather concentrates in favor of the populist
and the state. The ‘populist in power’ can thereby be
theorized alongside state mechanisms of control and
management. Populist rhetoric that was once critical of
the state, becomes mechanized in favor of its domination. The real issues recognized by those sympathetic
to populism, such “institutionalized corruption of special interests, lobbyists and big-money donors” (also
known as ‘the swamp’), become essentially neutralized.
Populist sympathizers’ issues with liberal democracies,
including inequality, corruption, etc. are recognized by
the populist and feel deeply seen. However, the populist does not need to actually accomplish the tasks set
out in the ideal populist ideology. Rather, the ideology
becomes a veil over existing and often contradictory
politics of the enduring status quo.
The concept of governmentality is the last piece necessary to clarify the paradox of populism. Populists
such as Trump play this mediatory role in which powerknowledge is concentrated asymmetrically and thereby
capitalized on. The state always has an incentive to
maintain this kind of power relation in favor of itself as
a self-producing and self-sufficient system. Populism,
while in theory challenges this power relation, ends up
reinforcing this same structure because the incentive
continues to exist when they govern. Populism, as an
ideology, has strong roots in the ideals of democracy,
that the government ought to work for and listen to the
needs of the average person. Behind this guise, however,
the realities of populist governance gain a democratic
justification even when it works to uphold establishment politics. The logical end to Foucault’s analysis
in Discipline and Punish is the creation of docile and
subjected bodies that no longer threaten power relations. He concludes in this genealogy, that technologies

of power lead to the ultimate end of obedience and
submission of subjects.
A similar end can be drawn from this analysis but
directed towards the political mind. The political fervor
that demands liberation from the inadequacies of the
liberal state is consolidated by the populist and ultimately squashed. Disciplinary power of the state “fixes
... arrests or regulates movements ... it must neutralize
the effects of counter-power that spring from them and
which form a resistance to power that wishes to dominate it: agitations, revolts, spontaneous organizations,
coalitions- anything that may establish horizontal conjunctions.” Thus, the populist paradox is no coincidence
or accident, but rather demonstrates state power maintenance towards order. That order can only be reached
when the threat that populist ideology poses to the existing state is fully negated.
Lastly, it is very difficult to disentangle populism
from its host ideology. One could argue that Trump’s
authoritarian or illiberal impulses could better explain
his role as a nexus of political knowledge dissemination
than his populist ideology. However, a key component
of Müller’s populist paradox is the ‘democratic justification’ that it provides to the host ideology. Again,
radical right populism occurs in the context of a liberal democracy that is seen as becoming too distant
from the regular citizen. There is not a rejection of the
democratic project itself. While the populist in power
might take actions that lead to democratic erosion, it is
done in a way that has a popular and/or democratic
justification. From this, the authoritarian or fascist tendencies of the radical right require a guise of populism
to be successful in the liberal democratic political context. Thus, while it is notoriously difficult to separate
the aspects of politics that are populist compared to
leftist, socialist, fascist, conservative, etc., in this case,
populism is a necessary component. An analysis that
seeks to understand Trump as a site of political knowledge without considerations of populism ideology and
the connection between the populist and ‘the people’
would be incomplete. The study of populism continues
to be tremendously salient to Trumpian politics.
3 CONCLUSIONS AND LIMITATIONS
Ultimately, populism scholarship ought to consider
populism as a mechanism of power maintenance by
the existing state. While this is a complicated conclusion, it is insufficient to continue considering populism
only from a ‘bottom-up’ perspective, which decontextualizes populist leaders and isolates them from the
state and its apparatuses. Rather, Foucault’s philosophy provides a framework for reconceptualizing the
phenomenon through a clarifying and critical framework. Roger Eatwell and Matthew Goodwin expertly
recognize this gap in existing scholarship in their text
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National Populism; there has been a disproportionate
focus on the ‘demand side’ of populist politics rather
than the ‘supply side.’ This analysis only just begins to
understand the complexities of populist supply and is
a call for further critical contextualization of populism,
especially in the Trump case.
From this, citizens ought to be suspicious of democratic justifications for policy and the suppression of
political consciousness like that seen in the Trump case.
The insidious impact of Müller’s populist paradox is
that some of the same issues identified by the populist
are continued under the guise of populism. The populist neutralizes the very political uproar that supports
them, and the liberal state is allowed to maintain its
order and the distribution of power-knowledge in a
political community without the same critique. Populists recognize many of the failures of the liberal democratic state without meaningfully caring to solve them,
hollowing out the liberatory and radical potential of
populist politics. Rather, the state in power seeks to
maintain its power and manage dissent directed towards itself. It develops mechanisms to release the civic
frustration but not in a way that challenges the asymmetrical distribution of power in which it benefits. Further, this analysis makes a case that the populist ought
not be thought of as exterior to the political establishment. Again, there is explanatory value in conceiving
of populist politics as a mechanism for the liberal democratic state. Populism may fluctuate in popularity and
attention, but fundamentally it remains hollowed, as a
“permanent shadow of representative politics.”
Nevertheless, this article is limited in its focus on the
application of the proposed framework on populism
cases. While the Trumpian populism section provides
a tremendously necessary exercise of the article’s theoretical contribution, there are many diverse cases of
populism. Populism studies are constantly confronted
with the issue of forming theory that is informed by
vastly differing political realities. Because of this, more
research to employ this framework on different cases
of populism is necessary to test its usefulness and accuracy beyond the Trump case. Moreover, this article does
not focus on left-wing populism and is thus, incomplete.
Further research in this area is undoubtedly imperative.
There are also limitations inherent to theoretical work
being done about state theories. Each state is a different entity with a complicated and multi-dimensional
history. How can we theorize about a state in general
given the diversity of actual states? This is not a unique
conundrum, but rather is inherent to much of the theoretical political science work being done. Again, there is
a need for more expansive research in this field, which
could work to include leftist populism.

4 EDITOR’S NOTES
This article was peer-reviewed.
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